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at regulation with the earlier convergence vs. divergence debates, which themselves built on
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Corporate Governance, Capital Market Regulation and the Challenge of
Disembedded Markets*
Peer Zumbansen**

I. INTRODUCTION: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Long before the present investigations into the role of corporate governance regulation in the
coming of the financial crisis1, corporate law had become a highly dynamic regulatory
laboratory for the study of a fast transforming body of norms governing corporate activities
worldwide. The immense attention that the field has been attracting over the past thirty years
from legal scholars, economists, political scientists, sociologists and even psychologists2 amply
testifies to the increasingly interdisciplinary nature of the corporate governance. Partly, this
development is owed to the dramatic transformation of corporate law over the recent past,
mostly influenced by the rapid expansion of global capital markets, which have placed
enormous pressure on the different existing national legal cultures pertaining to company law,
labour law and industrial relations regulation. The international competition over investment
and the innovation of ever‐new and more flexible financial instruments have over time induced
a fundamental transformation of corporate governance that is frequently referred to as a rise
of ‘financialism’3 and which has lead to a far‐reaching change in the understanding of the

*

This chapter builds on: P. Zumbansen 2010. 'The Next ‘Great Transformation’? The Double Movement in
Transnational Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Regulation', in C. Joerges and J. Falke (eds), The Social
Embeddedness of Transnational Markets. Oxford, Uk & Portland, OR, Hart Publishing, pp. forthcoming, and on P.
Zumbansen 2009. ''New Governance' in European Corporate Governance Regulation as Transnational Legal
Pluralism', European Law Journal 15: pp. 246‐276 [available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128145]. It was written
during my visit at University College Dublin 2009‐2010 and my June‐August 2010 Fellowship at the Hanse Institute
of Advanced Study. I am grateful for conversations on the topic to Blanaid Clarke and Colin Scott.
**

Professor of Law. Canada Research Chair in Transnational Economic Governance and Legal Theory. Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University, Toronto. 2009‐2010, Visiting Professor in Transnational Law and Corporate
Governance, University College Dublin. Email: Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca

1

B. R. Cheffins 2009. 'Did Corporate Governance “Fail” during the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the
S& P 500', Business Lawyer 65: pp. 1‐62
2

See eg R. Aguilera, D. Rupp, C. A. Williams and J. Ganapathi 2004. 'Putting the S Back in Corporate Social
Responsibility: a Multi‐Level Theory of Social Change in Organizations', Academy of Management Review 32: pp.
836‐863 [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol833/papers.cfm?abstract_id=567842]
3

L. E. Mitchell 2010. 'Financialism ‐ A (Very) Brief History', in P. Zumbansen and C. A. Williams (eds), The Embedded
Firm: Corporate Governance, Labour and Financial Capitalism. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, pp.
forthcoming; P. Zumbansen 2010. 'The New Embeddedness of the Corporation: Corporate Social Responsibility in
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business corporation from an organizational entity geared towards economic growth to an
investment vehicle with a very particular set of expectations attached to it.4 The nature and
consequences of this transformation have been a constant cause of dispute: whereas one camp
has been voicing, in sometimes triumphalist mode5, the inevitable convergence of corporate
governance systems towards a model focused on shareholder value maximization6, scholars in
the other camp have been questioning this alleged convergence on the basis of a host of
different sets of evidence, drawing on comparative political economy7, comparative company
law8 and historical research.9 Taken together, until just about the outbreak of the financial
crisis, ‘corporate governance’ had no doubt become one among the most interesting instances
for an interdisciplinary study of how market regulation rules unfold, are administered and
governed. Such investigations emerged against the background of an increasingly rich body of
comparative research10 and branched out into fascinating inquiries into the changing modes of
corporate organisation, corporate finance and corporate ‘democracy’ on the one hand11, and
the Knowledge Society', in P. Zumbansen and C. A. Williams (eds), The Embedded Firm: Corporate Governance,
Labour and Financial Capitalism. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, pp. forthcoming
4

W. Lazonick 1991. Business organization and the myth of the market economy, Cambridge University Press, ch. 3

5

The most explicit contribution was surely: H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman 2001. 'The End of History for Corporate
Law', Georgetown Law Journal 89: pp. 439‐468; see also H. Hansmann 2006. 'How Close is the End of History?'
Journal of Corporate Law 31: pp. 745‐750.
6

R. Kraakman, P. L. Davies, H. Hansmann, G. Hertig, K. J. Hopt, H. Kanda and E. B. Rock 2004. The Anatomy of
Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach, 2nd ed. 2009, Oxford University Press
7

S. Vitols 2001. 'Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK', in P. A. Hall and D. Soskice
(eds), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford/New York, Oxford
University Press, pp. 337‐360; J. W. Cioffi 2006. 'Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and the
Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and Germany', German Law Journal 7: pp. 533‐562
8

M. M. Siems and S. Deakin 2009. 'Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present and Future Research', Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics pp. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1428247
9

S. Deakin 2010. 'Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in the Long Run', in P. Zumbansen and C. A. Williams
(eds), The Embedded Firm: Corporate Governance, Labour and Financial Capitalism. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge
University Press, pp. forthcoming
10

See the excellent overview by K. J. Hopt 2006. 'Comparative Company Law', in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann
(eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law. Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 1161‐1191.
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into the particular nature of norms that govern corporate behaviour on the other.12 All along,
the political dimensions of such research were anything but invisible: large‐scale corporate
scandals around firms such as Enron or Parmalat13, headline‐making transnational take‐overs
such as the Mannesmann‐Vodafone deal14 or the public concern over management
compensation15 had long illustrated the political connotations of corporate governance
regulation.16 Remarkable, however, in this debate was the discrepancy between a seemingly
instant public outrage in the face of blatant corporate misdeeds and a relative amnesia with
regard to the only relatively recently changed environment in which the triumph of shareholder
value maximization had become the norm, not the exception. Well into the 1960s, corporations
– not only in Europe, but also in the United States – had been embedded in a tightly woven
regulatory infrastructure that created a politically charged environment for ‘private commercial
activity’.17
After the ‘roaring 1990s’ (J. Stiglitz) and an obsession with short term value creation over the
span of the last two and a half decades, the financial crisis has put all this into a new light. But
the amnesia is still there as if to show that there just is no learning from the past. While the
forceful debate over convergence versus divergence of corporate governance models would be
a rich reservoir of stored knowledge and insights into the different regulatory systems and
company law cultures that will inevitably shape any regulatory response envisioned today, the
present soul‐searching is strangely disinterested in drawing on that background. Instead, the
dominant concern seems to be to curb the ‘excesses’ and the ‘failures’ of the regulatory
11

See eg A. Dhir 2006. 'Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving
Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability', American Business Law Journal 43 pp. 365

12

T. Baums 2001. 'Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law Making Process of a Very
New Nature', German Law Journal 2: pp. at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43
13

W. W. Bratton 2002. 'Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value', Tulane Law Review 76: pp. 1275‐1361

14

P. Kolla 2004. 'The Mannesmann Trial and the Role of the Courts', German Law Journal 5: pp. 829‐847; S. Maier
2006. 'A Close Look at the Mannesmann Trial', German Law Journal 7: pp. 603‐610; M. Höpner and G. Jackson
2001. 'Entsteht ein Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle? Der Fall Mannesmann', Leviathan pp. 544‐563
15

L. A. Bebchuk and J. Fried 2004. Pay Without Performance. The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation,
Harvard University Press; G.‐P. Calliess and P. Zumbansen 2010. Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of
Transnational Private Law, Hart Publishing, pp. 227‐247
16

P. A. Gourevitch 2003. 'The Politics of Corporate Governance Regulation', Yale Law Journal 112: pp. 1829‐1880;
P. A. Gourevitch and J. Shinn 2005. Political Power and Corporate Control. The New Global Politics of Corporate
Governance, Princeton University Press; and the chapter by James Shinn – in this volume.
17

R. B. Reich 2007. Supercapitalism. The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life, Vintage, ch. 1

6

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 06 NO. 06

apparatus that is understood to have been at the root cause of the present calamities. There is
considerable evidence that the currently explored and designed regulatory ‘responses’ are
more geared towards the ‘fixing’ of the system that prevailed over the past thirty years rather
than towards a fundamental revisiting of the – existing – comparative and historical evidence as
to the complex nature of the business corporation, its regulatory environment and the
historical record of its evolution.18
The present chapter argues against such an ahistoric approach. It furthermore points to the
comparative and legal theoretical insights into differently evolving corporate governance
regimes as a basis for a better understanding of the particular nature of regulating corporate
activities today.

II. BEYOND COMPARISONS: THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
While comparative corporate or, in the English usage, company law researchers have come a
long way in illuminating the embedded nature of historically evolved, socio‐economically
shaped corporate governance models19, it seems as if – motivated by a cross‐fertilization of
different disciplinary approaches20 – scholars are now more than before engaged in both
comparative and interdisciplinary studies of existing corporate governance regulations. This is
surely one, but not the only important prerequisite for any study of corporate governance
today. To the degree that corporate governance has become a multi‐level regulatory
laboratory, in which ‘hard’ law overlaps and intersects with ‘soft’ law in numerous, fast‐evolving
ways, a traditional approach to the study of corporate or company law as a relatively confined
doctrinal area soon reaches its limits. The present context of public and private norm creating
actors engaged in the formulation, implementation and enforcement of corporate governance
18

Albeit, there are exceptions: K. W. Dam 2010. 'The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and
Comparative Perspectives', Chicago Journal of International Law 10: pp. 581‐638
19

See, for example, J. W. Cioffi 2000. 'State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The
State of the Art and Emerging Research', American Journal of Comparative Law 48: pp. 501; M. O'Sullivan 2003.
'The political economy of comparative corporate governance', Rev. Int'l Pol. Econ. 10: pp. 23‐72; S. Deakin 2007.
'Reflexive
Governance
and
European
Company
Law',
CLPE
Research
Paper
Series
(http://www.comparativeresearch.net/papers.jsp) & Cambridge Centre for Business Research, Working Paper No.
346 pp. http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp346.pdf; A. Rebérioux 2002. 'European Style of Corporate Governance
at the Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement', Journal of Common Market Studies 40: pp. 111‐134.
20

See eg the brillant study by L. Klöhn 2006. Kapitalmarkt, Spekulation und Behavioral Finance. Eine
interdisziplinäre und vergleichende Analyse zum Fluch und Segen der Spekulation und ihrer Regulierung durch
Markt und Recht, Duncker & Humblot.
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norms illustrates the need to expand corporate law’s analytical toolkit as well as to understand
corporate governance regulation in a wider context of increasingly transnational market
regulation.21
Today’s transnational corporate governance regulation is a product of fundamental
transformations of regulatory instruments and institutions. As corporate law is being shaped by
a complex mix of public, private, state‐ and non‐state‐based norms, principles and rules,
generated, disseminated and monitored by a diverse set of actors22, a closer look at corporate
governance offers two insights: one concerns the way in which the analysis of contemporary
corporate governance regulation can help us assess the emerging, new framework within which
corporate governance rules are evolving. Secondly, the way in which we begin to understand
the emerging regulatory framework as an illustration of contemporary rule‐making, the legal
pluralist deconstruction of formal and informal legal orders can be seen in a new light. Building,
on the one hand, on early legal‐sociological work by Ehrlich (‘living law’23) and Gurvitch (‘social
law’24), this inquiry revisits the core question of any sociology of law, namely ‘to investigate the
correlations between law and other spheres of culture.’25
For the purposes of this chapter, our focus will be on the tension between law and alternative
modes of market regulation. Expanding the spectrum, on the other, with a view to “legal
pluralism”26, contemporary assessments of ‘hybrid legal spaces’27 that are not sufficiently
21

Calliess & Zumbansen 2010, note 15, ch. 4 “Transnational Corporate Governance”

22

See, for example, the overview at www.ecgi.org, and www.transnationalcorporategovernance.net.

23

E. Ehrlich 1962. Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (orig. published in German as Grundlegung der
Soziologie des Rechts, 1913), Russell & Russell
24

G. Gurvitch 1947. Sociology of Law (orig. published in French as Problèmes de la sociologie du droit), Routledge
and Kegan Paul
25

E. Ehrlich 1962. Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (orig. published in German as Grundlegung der
Soziologie des Rechts, 1913), Russell & Russell, 486‐506 “The Study of the living law”; G. Gurvitch 1947. Sociology
of Law (orig. published in French as Problèmes de la sociologie du droit), Routledge and Kegan Paul; M. Rheinstein
1941. 'Review: Two Recent Books on Sociology of Law [reviewing Timasheff's 'Introduction' and Gurvitch's
'Elements']', Ethics 51: pp. 220‐231, 221‐2
26

S. F. Moore 1973. 'Law and Social Change: the semi‐autonomous field as an appropriate subject of study', Law &
Society Review 7: pp. 719‐746; M. Galanter 1981. 'Justice in many rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous
Law', Journal of Legal Pluralism 19: pp. 1‐47; S. Macaulay 1986. 'Private Government', in L. Lipson and S. Wheeler
(eds), Law and the Social Sciences. Washington, Russell Sage, pp. 445‐518; B. d. Sousa Santos 1987. 'Law: A Map of
Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law', Journal of Law & Society 14: pp. 279; G. Teubner 1992. 'The
Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism', Cardozo Law Review 13: pp. 1443‐1462; G. Teubner 2004. 'Societal
Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State‐Centred Constitutional Theory?' in C. Joerges, I.‐J. Sand and G. Teubner
(eds), Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance. Oxford, UK/Portland, OR, Hart Publishing, pp. 3‐28
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captured with references to local or national contexts, can help us better understand the
distinctly transnational character of such regulatory regimes. The transnational lens allows us
to study such regimes not as entirely detached from national political and legal orders, but as
emerging out of and reaching beyond them.28 The transnational dimension of new actors and
newly emerging forms of norms radicalizes their ‘semi‐autonomous’ nature (S. F. Moore) in the
following way: regulatory spaces are marked by a dynamic and often problematic
instrumentalist tension between formal and informal norm‐making processes, which cannot
easily be subjected to a political critique because the co‐existence of hard and soft laws does
not necessarily or always reflect on a strategy of depoliticisation. Instead, the choice of
different modes of regulations has its origin most frequently in a situation in which political
disagreement is only one among several roadblocks for effective regulation or, legal reform.29
Other problems are likely to result out of complex constellations of different overlapping and
colliding norm‐making authorities, something that has been shaping regulation attempts in
different transnational governance regimes, from securities regulation30, corporate governance,
labour law31, contract law in general32 and consumer protection law in particular33 are
27

P. Schiff Berman 2007. 'Global Legal Pluralism', S. Cal. L. Rev. 80: pp. 1155‐1237, 1155; see already S. Sassen
2006. Territory ‐ Authority ‐ Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton University Press.
28

For a discussion, see C. M. Scott 2009. ''Transnational Law' as Proto‐Concept: Three Conceptions', German Law
Journal 10: pp. 859‐876, and P. Zumbansen 2006. 'Transnational Law', in J. Smits (ed) Encyclopedia of Comparative
Law. Edward Elgar, pp. 738‐754.
29

With regard to the example of co‐determination, see eg J. N. Ziegler 2001. 'Corporate Governance in Germany:
Toward a New Transnational Politics?' in S. Weber (ed) Globalization and the European political economy. New
York, Columbia University Press, pp. 197‐228, and K. Pistor 1999. 'Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with
Governance Externalities', in M. Blair and M. J. Roe (eds), Employees and Corporate Governance. Washington,
Brookings Institution, pp. 163‐193.
30

J. Black and D. Rouch 2008. 'The development of global markets as rule‐makers: engagement and legitimacy',
Law and Financial Markets Review pp. 218‐233; T. M. J. Möllers 2008. 'Europäische Methoden‐ und
Gesetzgebungslehre im Kapitalmarktrecht. Vollharmonisierung, Generalklauseln und soft law im Rahmen des
Lamfalussy‐Verfahrens zur Etablierung von Standards', Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht pp. 480‐505
31

A. Supiot 1999. Au‐delà de l'emploi. Transformation du travail et devenir du droit du travail en Europe. Rapport
pour la Commission européenne., Flammarion; J. B. Atleson, L. Compa and K. Rittich 2008. International Labor Law:
Cases and Materials on Workers' Rights in the Global Economy, Thomson West
32

J. Basedow 1996. 'A Common Contract Law for the Common Market', Common Market Law Review 33: pp. 1169‐
1195
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increasingly marked by the existence of opt‐out clauses and self‐regulation mechanisms rather
than being defined by enforceable hard‐law rules. The dynamic character of such transnational
regulatory regimes poses distinct challenges for a political theory of market regulation, which
seems to be at least one of the several goals pursued within the present crisis‐response soul‐
search. The framework for a distinctly political critique of crisis‐response regulation is today
anything but certain. As long been recognised, even with the goal of an internal market in view,
any attempt at the harmonisation of norms and the institutionalisation of an administrative
framework is inevitably confronted with the particular dynamics of historically grown national
legal, political and political cultures and the still in many ways contested overarching economic
and political project of the EU. The sobering critique of the allegedly unbearable costs of
Europe’s ‘Social Model’34 only aggravate the already frustrating efforts of confronting the
current disembeddedness of global markets, which is one of the most important underlying
themes in today’s critique of ‘supercapitalism’35 and which received its most pertinent critique
by Karl Polanyi in his 1944 treatise on ‘The Great Transformation’.

III. THE PROBLEM OF DISEMBEDDEDNESS
In his famous chapters on ‘Societies and Economic Systems’ and the ‘Evolution of the Market
Pattern’, which we today refer to for the concept of the embeddedness of the market, Polanyi
noted, that ‘though the institution of the market was fairly common since the later Stone Age,
its role was no more than incidental to economic life.’36 A little later, he remarked that ‘the
outstanding discovery of recent historical and anthropological research is that man’s economy,
as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships. […] Neither the process of production nor that
of distribution is linked to specific economic interests attached to the possession of goods; but
every single step in that process is geared to a number of social interests which eventually will
be very different in a small hunting or fishing community than those in a vast despotic society,
but in either case the economic system will be run on non‐economic motives.’37
33

G.‐P. Calliess 2002. 'Reflexive Transnational Law. The Privatisation of Civil Law and the Civilisation of Private
Law', Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 23: pp. 185‐216; G.‐P. Calliess 2006. Grenzüberschreitende
Verbraucherverträge. Rechtssicherheit und Gerechtigkeit auf dem elektronischen Weltmarktplatz, Mohr Siebeck
34

THE ECONOMIST, 9 July 2010: “Can Anything Perk Up Europe?”

35

R. B. Reich 2007. Supercapitalism. The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life, Vintage; see
also Axel Haunschild, ‘Contingent Work: The Problem of Disembeddedness and Economic Reembeddedness’,
Management Review, 1 January 2004, http://www.allbusiness.com/human‐resources/careers/1078135‐1.html
36

Karl K. Polanyi 1944. The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our Time, Beacon Press), p.
43; this passage is later complemented – in the same chapter – by his remarks about ‘man as a social being’ (ibid.,
p. 46): ‘His natural endowments reappear with a remarkable constancy in societies of all times and places; and the
necessary preconditions of the survival of human society appear to be immutably the same.’
37

Polanyi, p. 46.
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As is well known, this chapter (4) concludes with the elaboration of the three famous market‐
structuring and market–organising principles: ‘reciprocity’ (related to family and kinship), ‘re‐
distribution’ (the central collection and dissemination of production – ‘… these functions of an
economic system proper are completely absorbed by the intensively vivid experiences which
offer superabundant non‐economic motivation for every act performed in the frame of the
social system as a whole.’ (p. 48)), and ‘householding’ (oeconomia), which precedes the rising
levels of division of labour, as well as the role of money and credit. Building on this taxonomy,
Polanyi famously wrote that ‘the control of the economic system by the market is of
overwhelming consequence to the whole organization of society: it means no less than the
running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded in social
relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system.’38
It is here, where, as under a magnifying glass, we not only find the kernel of the critique of
capitalism unfolding in the latter half of the Twentieth century,39 but also a powerful illustration
of the differentiation concept of contemporary modern sociology, most strikingly, the thesis of
the hegemony of the economic system in a functionally‐differentiated society.40 Again, in
Polanyi’s words: ‘The vital importance of the economic factor to the existence of society
precludes any other result. For once the economic system is organised in separate institutions,
based on specific motives and conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a
manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. This is the meaning of the
familiar assertion that a market economy can function only in market society.’41 A little further
on, Polanyi added a devastatingly prophetic observation of competitive markets and
shorttermism by noting that ‘with every step that the state took to rid the market of
particularist restrictions, of tolls and prohibitions, it imperiled the organized system of
production and distribution which was now threatened by unregulated competition and the
intrusion of the interloper who ‘scooped’ the market but offered no guarantee of
permanency.’42

38

Polanyi, p. 57.

39

See, for example, J. Derrida 1994. Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New
International, Routledge); R. Rorty 1998. Das kommunistische Manifest 150 Jahre danach, Suhrkamp).
40

N. Luhmann 1988. Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp).

41

Ibid.

42

Polanyi, p. 66.
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But, in which way if at all can Polanyi help us think through the challenges of crisis‐response
market regulation? Can his observations offer analytical tools for an adequate explanation of
contemporary markets? I want to suggest that we look for an answer through a detour. Using
corporate governance and capital market regulation as an illustration of the evolution of
transnational markets, we can canvass a number of theoretical approaches that directly or
indirectly draw upon Polanyi’s critique of dis‐embeddedness. Even where contemporary
regulators, policy‐makers and EU law, company law and securities regulation scholars do not
engage with Polanyi per se, the pertinence of his assessment of the transformation of states,
societies and markets is, nevertheless, both evident and crucial for our assessment of the
argumentative and conceptual context in which a re‐formulation of Polanyi’s embeddedness
theme would have to take place.
As such, the following observations can be at best cursory comments on the evolving
institutional and conceptual dimensions of ‘market regulation’ or ‘state intervention’ in the
areas of capital market law and corporate governance. While, geographically, the chapter
draws on examples from the EU, the concerned regulatory regimes can more adequately be
understood as ‘global assemblages’ in the sense introduced by the sociologist Saskia Sassen.43
Building on her work, I understand these regulatory regimes as examples of transnational legal
pluralism.44 They are, on the one hand, neither exclusively national (domestic) nor
international, while, on the other, they are not meant to eliminate or to overcome the nation
state.45 Instead, these assemblages are constituted through persistent local activity and
interpretation, and are ‐ as such ‐ comprised of human, institutional and technological
elements, the latter resulting pre‐dominantly from the breathtaking advances in information
technology (‘digitalisations’)46 and the extreme acceleration in information, knowledge and
capital transfer they made available. It is the precarious relation between national and global
governance regimes that speaks to the continuing need for a specifically legal perspective on
the re‐configuration of ‘spaces and places’, which Sassen depicts in her work. And it is this
43

For this concept, see Sassen, above, note 27; for earlier elaborations, see idem, The Global City, (Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1991), and idem, Globalization and Its Discontents. Essays on the New Mobility of
People and Money, (New York: The New Press, 1998); see, also, M. Amstutz & V. Karavas, ‘Weltrecht: Ein
Derridasches Monster’, in: G.‐P. Calliess, A. Fischer‐Lescano, D. Wielsch & P. Zumbansen, (eds), Soziologische
Jurisprudenz. Liber Amicorum für Gunther Teubner zum 65. Geburtstag, (Berlin‐New York: Walter de Gruyter,
2009), pp. 647‐674.
44

P. Zumbansen, ‘‘New Governance’ in European Corporate Governance Regulation as Transnational Legal
P.
Pluralism’, (2008) 15 European Law Journal, pp. 246‐276, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128145;
Zumbansen, Transnational Legal Pluralism, (2010) 1:2 Transnational Legal Theory, available as CLPE Research Paper
01/2010, at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542907
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emphasis on the legal theoretical re‐construction of Polanyi’s theme of embeddedness that
holds considerable promise for rendering a timely concept of transnational markets.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: First, I will contrast the pursued
regulatory strategies in the two areas of capital market law and corporate governance in the
EU. The central assumption of this complementary presentation of these two areas, which have
seen a surge in regulatory activity – in both Europe and beyond – is that, in particular, the
transformation of corporate finance during the last two decades has led to a far‐reaching
approximation of both areas. This is a remarkable development, as it raises intriguing questions
regarding, for one, the methodology that informs the conceptual construction and the
demarcation of legal doctrinal fields. In other words, how and why do we (continue to)
distinguish between capital market law and corporate governance (law)? Secondly, the
apparent overlapping and inter‐twining of these two distinct regulatory areas presents
formidable challenges for our understanding of the law and the specific regulatory instruments
which are relied upon to govern each or both of the areas concerned.
In the next section, I will reflect on the driving forces behind the continuing regulatory reform
process in both areas and discuss recurring concepts such as ‘maximum’, ‘minimum’, or
‘reflexive’ harmonisation and regulatory competition against the analysis of Polanyi’s market
embeddedness and the work on the so‐called ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ studies.47 The last section
seeks to provide an explanation for the particular forms of legal regulatory regimes that are
emerging in the named areas by elaborating the concept of transnational legal pluralism.

IV. CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. IN SEARCH OF A HARMONISED EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKET
We can here only provide a very abbreviated overview and assessment of the developments
made with regard to the regulation of capital market law in recent times. One of the central
insights one can gain from the fast evolving scholarly work in this area seems to be that long‐
term, economic growth in Europe is closely linked to an effectively and supportively regulated
securities market. Namely, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
have been playing decisive roles in the context of shaping a continuously evolving, regulatory
framework in this area. Central to the Commission’s regulatory efforts was the 1999 release of
47

J.R. Hollingsworth, ‘New perspectives on the spatial dimensions of economic coordination: tensions between
globalization and social systems of production’, (1998) 5 Review of International Political Economy, pp. 482‐507;
P.A. Hall & D. Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage,
(Oxford‐New York, Oxford University Press, 2001).
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the Financial Services Action Plan (FASP), which spurred a tremendously dynamic series of
legislative initiatives in its wake. The FASP came into being at a time when there was very little
movement and even less advancement in the area of corporate law harmonisation – some even
spoke of an ‘almost empty’ agenda.48 Programmatic and regulatory initiatives in the context of
the FASP have included the inauguration of the Lamfalussy Commission, which, in 2001, after
the release of a preliminary report and the initiation of a consultation process, produced its
comprehensive final report, in which it addressed and discussed both the challenges and the
needs to work towards an efficient and dynamic securities market in Europe.49 Echoing the
views shared by a wide spectrum of scholars and practitioners in the field, the Report
identified, from the outset, the immediate necessity to bring swift reform to the existing
regulatory framework in European financial regulation. This reform had become necessary
mainly in the light of the breathtaking advances made in financial activity around the world
over the past 15‐20 years, the consequences of which, for securities regulation on the one
hand, and for corporate (organisation and finance) law on the other, were becoming
increasingly obvious.50
Despite the fact that the FASP regulatory initiatives are characterised by a very recent history,
the wide‐ranging assessments of their structure, aspirations, their successes and their
shortcomings are fast beginning to fill symposia, edited collections and bibliographies, not to
mention the abundance of working papers appearing, in short succession, in the Social Science
Research Network (www.ssrn.com). Central to the debates surrounding the state of the
European Financial Market after the introduction of a number of Directives is the concern over
the inconsistency of the implementation of the Directives on the part of the individual Member
States. The verdict, for the time being at least, is that, due to the many political differences, on
the one hand, and the existing variations of securities regulation institutions across Europe, on
the other, a harmonised securities market is still a long way off.51 Examined closely, the
Prospectus,52 Market Abuse,53 Takeover Bids54 and Transparency55 Directives and the Rating
48

L. Enriques & M. Gatti, ‘EC Reforms of Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Law: Do They Tackle Insiders’
Opportunism?’, (2007) 28 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, pp. 1‐33, at 4.
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Standards’, (2008) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht, pp. 480‐505, at 482.
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Agencies Regulation56 allow a range of varying implementation regimes that are altogether
committed to the idea of ‘optionality’,57 but, as a consequence, fall short of bringing about an
effectively levelled playing‐field for actors in the European Market. At the same time, the
Lamfalussy Commission strengthened and formalised the operation of a monitoring
mechanism, embodied by the European Securities Committee (ESC) on the one hand, and the
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) on the other. These committees play an
important role in the evolving multi‐polar and multi‐level process of European securities
regulation.58 After the political orientation has been identified through the Council and the
Parliament, the Commission and the Parliament – in collaboration with the ESC and the CESR –
design the more concrete implementation and execution procedures. It is after this process
that, in a third step, the CESR, through the different regulatory agencies that it brings together,
produces recommendations and benchmark standards. Despite the fact that these
recommendations and benchmarks are without legally‐binding power, they are, nevertheless,
meant to provide a compellingly coherent reference mark for the implementation of the
measures introduced. In a fourth and final step, the Commission is in charge to assess whether
the implementation of the regulations has been successful.
The particular dynamics of this regulatory area raise significant questions concerning the way in
which legislative goals are being identified, which interests are being considered, and how
these feed into both the constitution and the re‐constitution of distinct doctrinal and
conceptual fields.59 As in other areas, notably European Contract law and, more specifically,
54
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For a conceptual discussion, see G. Hertig & J.A. McCahery, ‘An Agenda for Reform: Company and Takeover Law
in Europe’, in: G. Ferrarini, K.J. Hopt, J. Winter & E. Wymeersch, (eds), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in
Europe, (Oxford‐New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 21‐49.
58

T. M. J. Möllers 2010. 'Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen europäischen Finanzmarktaufsichtsstruktur ‐ Ein
systematischer Vergleich der Rating‐VO (EG) Nr. 1060/2009 mit der geplanten ESMA‐VO', Neue Zeitschrift für
Gesellschaftsrecht pp. 285‐290, 285, identifies six levels of capital market regulation now in existence (laws,
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European consumer protection law,60 the pursuit of a European regulatory framework in capital
markets law and corporate governance occurs against highly‐charged assessments of the
underlying assumptions and goals that inform the regulatory process. In this context, market
efficiency represents a highly persuasive formula which, when studied more closely, does not –
in itself ‐ contain much clarification as to the interests and goals that are actually being
pursued. This dilemma, which certainly seems to plague any reform agenda in complex
regulatory areas, is further exacerbated by the fact that the European securities market (or, the
European Company Law Scene61) constitutes an even more complex arena and context than a
historically‐evolved regulatory area in a particular state.62 As will be argued more fully below,
substantive law reforms in Europe regularly occur against the backdrop of the open‐ended
European integration project.
Before we briefly highlight the particular dimensions of European Corporate Governance
Regulation (ECGR), we shall pause for a moment to reflect upon the connections between
capital market law and corporate governance. The different speeds at which each area has
been developing in Europe could suggest that it would, indeed, be possible to distinguish neatly
between them as clearly distinct, conceptually and doctrinally contained, regulatory areas.
However, there are several elements at play, which point in the opposite direction, which we
briefly want to allude to under the heading of the ‘financialisation of the corporation’.

B. THE FINANCIALISATION OF THE CORPORATION
Since the 1965s, the transformation of the corporation has led to a widely‐held acceptance of
subjecting every element of a business firm to varied processes of financialisation,63 which was
spurred by a number of path‐breaking innovations in financial economics that eventually
60

U. Mattei & F. Nicola, ‘A ‘Social Dimension’ in European Private Law? The Call for Setting a Progressive Agenda’,
(2006) 41 New England Law Review, pp. 1‐66; G. Howells & T. Wilhelmsson, ‘EC Consumer Law: Has it Come of
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(2002)
3
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Law
Journal,
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prepared the ground for a new ‘theory of the firm’64 and was over time complemented by a fast
proliferating landscape of investment actors.65 This transformation affected corporations
throughout the world and was driven by the attempt to effectively attract a highly diversified
investment of global investment pools. Far‐reaching de‐regulation with regard to capital control
during the 1980s facilitated an unprecedented flow of capital across national boundaries, which
permitted securitisations, often repeatedly, of a large number of assets, including pension
schemes, real estate and commercial claims. With companies designing corporate strategies
primarily with stock performance in mind, shareholder value became the dominating principle
in assessing corporate performance, fuelled by a seemingly unstoppable growth in index values.
The focus on the short‐term volatility of corporate shares in order to evaluate a company’s
merits and prospects quickly became the only perspective from which we claimed to
understand a firm.66 But this narrowing of the field of vision came at a price, as both investors
and managers became blind to the fact that the very environment of firms had been
dramatically transformed over the course of a few decades. To the degree that the
advancement of communication and information technology revolutionised the transfer of
derivatives ‐ sometimes as a company’s virtual assets ‐ across vast strategic spaces, the
attention given to stock performance eventually removed the firm from its geographical
environment by elevating it into a purely ethereal realm. In consequence of its financialisation,
the share or other security of the corporation (its ‘reference asset’ for the creation of another
synthetic security) became radically virtualised. What architects of synthetic credit instruments
call the reference asset, which can be the original subject of a loan or security, became radically
virtualised in relation to the business corporation. The corporation, in turn, was reduced to an
anchoring point for independently originated financial programmes, thereby positioning the
corporation no longer in a real economy, but in an artificial space of financial engineering.
In the end, the firm ‐ as we have come to understand it over the past thirty years ‐ had even
outgrown even the ideal model of a nexus of contracts.67 In order to remain operational, the
64

A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz 1972. 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization', American
Economic Review 62: pp. 777‐795; M. C. Jensen 2000. A Theory of the Firm. Governance, Residual Claims, and
Organizational Forms, Harvard University Press
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67

A.A. Alchian & H. Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’, (1972) 62 American
Economic Review, pp. 777‐795;M.C. Jensen, A Theory of the Firm. Governance, Residual Claims, and Organizational
Forms, (Cambridge MA‐London: Harvard University Press, 2000).

2010]

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CAPITAL MARKETS

17

model had to be adapted to the processes of financial engineering, which – at least partially –
moved the corporation out of the centre of the labyrinth of contracts in which it was, or its
securities were, entangled. The financialisation of the corporation and its securities entailed a
radical separation of the corporation, itself, from the instruments that represent claims in, of,
or against, the corporation. The corporation had become a nodal point for an ephemeral
crossing, the inter‐linking and overlapping of financial vectors, channelled through the glass
structure of the legal person, with almost no relationship with the original ‘business’ of the
corporation. A dream fulfilled, with money flowing in and out of the firm, the corporation had
become a virtual realm for strategic investment.
The financialisation of corporate governance is powerfully reflected in the fast rise in
importance of financial experts on the boards of directors, the importance of financial expertise
in the making of business decisions and, finally, in the transformation of the educational
environment for the supporting professions – including lawyers, consultancies and accountants.
The flip‐side of this is the dramatic erosion of the representation of labour interests in the
contemporary business corporation.68 Where corporate activity had, for a long time, been
marked by a lively public political discussion of the interests of the different constituencies in
the firm, its financial and physical virtualisation69 increasingly erased the reference points for a
general assessment of what corporations were actually doing.
As suggested above, the financialisation of the corporation led to significant changes in the
corporate regulatory framework. The financialisation of the business corporation, which,
arguably, had always been part of the corporate identity,70 does not, however, exhaust itself,
neither in the adaptation of corporate finance to the globally available, highly‐diversified
investment tools and opportunities, nor in the wide‐ranging turn of regulatory policy towards
shareholder value, which gave rise to the ‘corporate governance movement’ of the last decade
in both corporate law theory and practice. Moreover, the financialisation paradigm eventually
led to a dramatic re‐configuration of the ‘embedded corporation’71 by upsetting and shifting
68
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the institutional framework of the corporation’s regulatory environment,72 with tremendous
consequences at both the domestic and the transnational level. As national governments found
themselves drawn into highly‐charged political debates regarding the goals of company law
reform, which were themselves increasingly likened to existential questions of national
survival,73 the European law‐maker, too, came under growing pressure to follow up on long‐
standing promises and aspirations to work towards a more effective level playing‐field for
European companies.

C. THE TURNS OF EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Against this background, it is unsurprising that the history of European corporate law regulation
is marked by the diversity of the interests and concerns invested in this area of regulation.
While the legislative record was, until recently, not altogether comprehensive,74 the ECGR has,
in the last years, become one of the most vibrant sectors of norm‐creation and regulatory
interaction. As such, the ECGR has become a regulatory universe of its own, with a large
portfolio within the Commission’s Internal Market division, and a seemingly tireless expert
community feeding into the policy‐making and norm‐making processes at every turn. With the
ECGR long having left the confines of the European Court of Justice, the Council and the
Parliament, it has expanded into an extremely versatile, comparative and transnational legal
field. The ECGR constitutes a semi‐autonomous field, comprised both of hard law and social
norms, which are in a constant relationship of complementarity, fusion and irritation.75 As such,
the ECGR presents formidable challenges for legal, economic, sociological or political analysis.
From the point of view of legal pluralism, the particularity and the intricacy of the ECGR lies in
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its mixed constitution of law and ‘social norms’.76 Seen through the legal pluralist lens, the
ECGR develops as a co‐evolutionary process, in which the imposition of law – which
encompasses regulations, directives, recommendations and judgments – is both shaping and
being shaped by the norms evolving outside of its imposition. Similar to the unpredictability of
the consequences and the effects of rights/principles‐transplants,77 the ECGR faces enormous
challenges in terms of both legal certainty and strategy, given its many sources of potential
disturbance, irritation, and complementing points, due to its complex regulatory agenda.
Adding to the difficulties arising from the multilevel and multi‐stakeholder dimension in
company law regulation in Europe, the ECGR has amplified the tensions that underlie the
conceptual and architectural distinction between ‘company’ and ‘capital market’ law, which are
deeply embedded in a country’s market regulation history.78 Struggling with competing policy
goals regarding the enhancement of market freedoms as they relate to capital market rules, on
the one hand, and to corporate governance law, on the other, the ECGR is driven to actualise
‘the best of both worlds’. However, while corporate law, itself, appears to continue to
withstand all attempts at de‐construction and de‐mystification by other conceptual frameworks
with regard to what corporations actually do,79 the ECGR finds itself deeply involved in a large,
ever‐so amorphous market‐building project. The understanding of the ‘function’ of the firm, as
it informs ECGR, must now extend far beyond the financial‐organisational dimensions that
became the ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ of corporate law. Within the European project, in particular
after the Lisbon Summit 2000 and its more recent re‐invigoration in the form of a ‘social
makeover’,80 corporate law has become a strategic token in a complex multilevel governance
76
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game that brings a much wider range of players to the policy‐making table than any single‐
market regulation unit would reasonably want to assume responsibility for.
The ECGR, driven by pressing competitive, social, environmental and monitoring demands,
continues to evolve in the particularly accentuated and contested space of the competitiveness
agendas of the EU Member States. As such, the ECGR has never sat comfortably within the
wider market integration agenda. The real challenges of company law harmonisation, however,
became impressively obvious during the exhausting struggle over the adoption of a regulation
concerning the creation of the European Company statute, originally initiated in the 1970s, and
eventually passed after many more compromises, in 2001. Another illustration of how the ECGR
has been inextricably caught up in the European ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ was, without doubt,
the long contest over a European Takeover Directive, which resulted, in 2004, in a Directive full
of loopholes and opt‐out clauses.81
As the regulatory trajectory of the ECGR continues to unfold, we must be even more sensitive
to the degree to which this enterprise remains deeply embedded in the particular dynamics of
the multilevel governance of European integration, on the one hand,82 and the globalisation of
markets and regulatory processes, on the other.83 Under such conditions, an assessment of the
concrete forms of norm‐creation presents great challenges due to the ECGR’s complex
appearance, which ranges from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ law, to norms that are developed, promulgated
and disseminated by a panoply of public and private actors.84 Thus, instead of trying to free the
81
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ECGR from its embeddedness in this complex regulatory environment, the emphasis must be on
the exact opposite. It is precisely by embracing the embeddedness of the ECGR as a
transnational legal field that we can begin to see the concrete, as well as the amorphous, forms
of change more clearly. Embeddedness, here, is understood in the following four dimensions:
1. The ECGR is informed by the policy and legislative dynamics between corporate law and
capital‐market law (securities regulation) as well as between corporate law and labour law,
which are categorisations of functionally separable legal areas that can be found in all
advanced industrialised societies and which are increasingly challenged through the global
forces of rule‐making;
2. The ECGR is entangled in the European ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ with regard to corporate
and labour regulation, as evidenced, for example, in the struggle over the Takeover
Directive and the statute of the Societas Europaea;
3. The ECGR is part of the larger project which aims towards the completion of the European
internal market,85 in particular, in the post‐Lisbon environment of knowledge society
politics within the EU;86
4. The ECGR is a semi‐autonomous field, which is both vibrant and precarious, and is always
threatened by the balance between official law‐making, transnational consultations, expert
committee preparatory work, recommendations, communications and standardisation,
which we see unfolding at domestic, EU‐supranational and transnational levels.
In Europe, the turn to ‘law and finance’ is occurring very persuasively,87 and with consequences
for the continuously evolving regulatory landscape. As the European Commission continues to
pursue a very effective dual agenda of revising and expanding the reach of capital market law
Directives, on the one hand, and on indirectly reforming company law rules, on the other, we
find a powerful illustration of the emerging culture of interpretation. Making the ‘European
Company Law Scene’ one of the most vibrant law‐making and norm‐making markets
and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Coordination’, (2005) 11
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worldwide,88 the European Commission has pursued one of the most sophisticated strategies of
indirect, soft‐law‐making by delegating far‐reaching bench‐marking and best‐practice
formulation authorities to expert committees, on whose work the Commission has since issued
far‐reaching recommendations which, more often than not, have been the preparation for
Directives.89
These ECGR developments thus represent a series of highly diversified norm‐setting processes
which have resulted in a veritable explosion of corporate governance codes in Europe and
elsewhere.90 With the proliferation of corporate governance codes, influenced and driven by
the international91 and transnational activities of norm‐setting, discussion and thought
exchange,92 it has become increasingly difficult to identify a single institution or author of a set
of norms. Instead, the production and dissemination of corporate governance rules has, for
some time now, taken on the nature of migrating standards, and a cross‐fertilisation of norms is
now regarded as both eminent and necessary in shaping future corporate activity. A distinct
feature of this de‐territorialised production of norms is the radical challenge that these
processes pose for our understanding of what we call law proper. With the dissemination of
corporate governance codes, disclosure standards and rules, best practices and codes of
conduct, not only corporate and securities law, but also other fields of law – such as labour and
employment law – change. It is this strangely amorphous space, which, due to its intricate
relation to concrete places such as nation states, spheres of political decision making, of protest
and so on, creates a dramatic challenge for attempts to foster the institutional conditions for
public policy debates.
Loyal to the new institutional economists’ reading, this liquidification of institutions constituted
by the de‐centralisation of norm producers is repeated, mirrored and reflected in the
hybridisation of the norms themselves. Everything can become an ‘institution’, from a fully‐
88
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fledged regulatory apparatus to a handshake among business partners. It is in this sense that
the study of the proliferation of corporate governance codes and company law production in
general, and of the rules of remuneration disclosure in particular, feeds into a broader research
into the changing face of legal regulation in globally‐integrated market‐places, which
themselves become representations of society – which is precisely the nightmare that Polanyi
so aptly depicted.93 What shines through the particular developments in individual jurisdictions
in this regard is a most poignant exhibition of particular legal and political cultures and political
economies of law‐making and economic regulation.94

D. THE EPHEMERAL ‘DOUBLE MOVEMENT’ IN THE ECMR AND THE ECGR
As has become clear, the evolution of European capital market law and corporate governance
harmonisation not only offers itself as a case in point for the intricate process of European
integration, but also serves to illustrate the nature of legal evolution as reflected in the
increasingly multilevel and trans‐territorialised norm production in the law of corporate
governance. On the one hand, business has, for a long time now, come to be organised in a
globe‐spanning manner, with historically strong attempts to liberate itself of the regulatory
aspirations or constraints of nation states.95 This is part of the nation state’s larger struggle over
regulatory sovereignty with regard to the economic processes that unfold both within and
beyond national borders. On the other hand, however, corporations remain, in many respects,
embedded in a complex field of historically grown, institutionally and legally structured
frameworks of national regulation and administration.96 And, because national corporate laws
are embedded in such distinct socio‐economic cultures, and in historically‐grown legal and
industrial regimes, scholars in comparative corporate governance have become increasingly
aware of the methodological challenges in comparing different corporate governance
93
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regimes.97 After early critiques of a functional approach to comparative law98 had contributed
to comparative legal scholarship’s becoming much more nuanced, contextualised, and
differentiated,99 contemporary scholars place great emphasis upon the particular cultures of
corporate governance norms, the role of institutions, policies, path dependency, and
innovation.100 James Fanto astutely observed that ‘[c]orporate governance practices are partly
cultural and historical products. In this context, culture can be defined as the conceptual
framework whereby individuals, generally of the same country, understand and mediate the
pressures of the world and motivate as well as explain their actions. As the corporation is a
meaningful and purposeful human response to economic and social pressures, culture clearly
informs corporate governance practices.’101
Indeed, the considerably short history of European company and capital market law regulation
provides numerous illustrations of this observation. There can be no doubt that there has been
a strong push for streamlining in various areas of both company law and securities regulation,
with changes having been initiated in particular by increased demands for transparency and
more efficient management control.102 Yet, despite these developments, from a comparative
viewpoint, company law has been considerably less amenable to radical reform than securities
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regulation,103 and even here the road towards a fully harmonised securities market is not a
straight or easy one.104 European company law reflects the persisting challenges to European
integration in that it highlights the difficulties of creating a body of law for social actors who
have been relying on national rules, institutions, and customs within the nation state.105 This
process has consistently highlighted the immense political and socio‐economic obstacles
emerging from the different ‘varieties’ and ‘models’ of capitalism of the different Member
States,106 which are often associated with the substantive costs in bringing about an effective
regulatory regime for companies operating and investing on the European market.107
Any attempt, therefore, at assessing and evaluating the regulatory goals as well as the
prospects of the pursued ECGR and capital market law agendas needs to recognise the degree
to which such rules are being developed in, and emerging from, a multilevel process of norm‐
production. With this, a study of European company law necessarily has to take into
consideration not only the impact of different localities and the types of norm‐production
emerging in European‐wide rules and standards, but also the persisting patterns of political
opposition to reform.108 The German rules governing worker participation in business
corporations remain, in this respect, a notorious example of a regime deeply embedded in the
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country’s political economy.109 To touch upon one part of the legal framework would be likely
to result in turmoil which would involve numerous other norms and institutions governing co‐
determination.110 Likewise, the long and painful struggle over a European takeover regime
clearly reflected the complexities of a regulatory, socio‐economic minefield, made up of
cultural pre‐dispositions, institutional traditions (Volkswagen111) and established networks ‐ all
of which make any capital market law‐oriented reformer frown, at the very least.112

V. THE MULTIFACETED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
POLANYI AND BEYOND
A. THE CALL FOR A NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Where does this leave us? Enriching the classical, formal‐functionalist scope of comparative law
in the past, scholars in law, economics, sociology and political science have, over the last
twenty years, been developing an arguably more interdisciplinary and considerably richer
perspective in their efforts to capture the particular dynamics of corporate governance
regulation. In light of the space here available, the following list shall highlight the aspects that
such a perspective‐building process has been focusing on:
1. The ‘politics’ of corporate law‐making, meaning the observable policies and
programmatic directions of corporate regulation. Corporate regulatory politics have been
among the most discussed and contested elements at the heart of the global corporate
109
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governance debate. This debate started long before the well‐known cases of corporate
mis‐management, fraud and accounting manipulation within and around Enron. While
this political debate is marked by significant domestic dimensions, a remarkable,
comparative perspective has given corporate law scholarship some decisive impulses. The
focus has overwhelmingly been on the opposition of the so‐called ‘insider’ versus the
‘outsider’ model of corporate governance.113 While the former signifies the role of firm‐
internal control mechanisms, stakeholders and processes vis‐à‐vis management, in other
words, labour, financial institutions, directors, etc., the latter, the ‘outsider’ model labels
a structure whereby management is held accountable largely through the presence of
independent directors and through the securities markets. The global debate over the last
fifteen years has been largely concerned with the discernible trends of either pointing
towards a worldwide convergence towards a shareholder‐oriented model, or of
representing different, resisting models defended in an argument favouring divergence.
Over the past few years, this debate has differentiated considerably, and today not only
are there legions of comparative corporate law publications, but also more and more
authors are taking the historical and sociological work explaining the institutional
evolution of market structures of different countries into account.114 This, in itself, is a
remarkable return to an earlier period in which corporate law scholarship, much more
generally, displayed a great interest in the political economy of which corporate
regulation was a part.115
2. The other focus of transnational corporate governance research116 has been on the
types of norms that regulate corporate behaviour today, on the authors of these norms,
the domestic and international, public and private institutions. This part of a faster
growing area of regulatory work within corporate and capital market law,117 as well as in
other very prominent fields, such as standardisation, focuses on the interaction of hard,
public, official law‐making, on the one hand, and on the private, unofficial, soft norm‐
generation, on the other. From this perspective, corporate law is transformed into an
around‐the‐clock laboratory for the study of the shift in law‐making from public mandate
113
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to private self‐regulation, for example, by delegation or appropriation of ‘law’‐making
authority, as illustrated, for example, by the proliferation codes of conduct. Certainly, an
important caveat is already in order at this point. Only a comparative perspective on
different corporate law‐making cultures can open our eyes to the differences of
approaches in norm‐creation, enactment and enforcement of the regulatory bodies which
govern what corporations do today.118 Comparativists have long established the
remarkable differences in corporate law‐making between North America and Europe to
be marked, first and foremost, by the difference between enabling law in the U.S. and
more mandatory forms of corporate law rules in Europe. This difference is again echoed
in other much‐referenced contrasts, such as that between common law on one side of
the Atlantic, and civil law on the other, with the UK interestingly sitting on both sides of
the fence.119 In the process of studying the proliferation of corporate law norms,
distinctions between enabling and mandatory law, and between common law and civil
law, matter, but ongoing research questions the stability and, as such, the long‐term
sustainability and explanatory force of these distinctions.120
3. This has dramatic consequences for the position of corporate law within a larger, highly
differentiated, dynamic regulatory environment. Corporate law unfolds in a web of
norms, official and unofficial, public and private, from which it receives impulses and to
which it sends others – this web is increasingly transnational in both origin and reach.121
This is certainly true with regard to the evolving private law culture related to product
safety, contract regulation, consumer protection, or, to switch to public law, with regard
to the applicable environmental law applicable to corporations. But, there is clearly
118
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another set of regulations, which, only nominally, do not figure as a part of corporate law
– whether this is by choice or necessity needs to be discussed. Corporations employ a
workforce in a dramatically diversifying global division of labour, no longer merely
recognisable by the blue collars of some, and the white collars of others. Both today’s
workforce and the environment in which it is operating have become a subject of study
in, and of, itself. Richard Sennett’s work on the transformation of work is just one of the
more recent illustrations of a far‐reaching sociological interest in the fate of workers
today.122 Labour lawyers have, for a long time, been struggling to re‐assert regulatory
capacity in the interest of protecting workers’ interests in a globalised economy better,
where holding a job and working on a project has come to replace long‐term
employment, without, however, always delivering the accompanying promises of
increased control, private autonomy and skills building.123 In short, ‘work’, and its
changing face, has become something that corporate lawyers increasingly look to more
and more – just as Dean Clark told them to in his 1986 textbook.124

B. THE NEW EMBEDDEDNESS OF
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PLURALISM

THE

FIRM: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

AS

Today, regulatory spaces are opened up and continue to expand as a result of complex
interactions of processes and ideas, central to whom is the transformation of formal rule
creation in politically embedded state legal systems towards a system of specialised
transnational law regimes. Such regimes consist of hard and soft laws, which emerge through
processes that involve public and private actors, through the experimentation with new rules
and their subsequent rejection, transformation and – temporary – solidification. Corporate
governance norms provide a telling example of this transformation of traditional state‐
originating, official norm‐setting in favour of increasingly de‐centralised, spatialised processes
of norm production125, which can be understood through the concept of ‘Rough Consensus and
Running Code’, originally developed in Internet governance.126 The very nature of these norms
themselves has been changing dramatically as a result of this new form of transnational
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embeddedness. Central to the observation in the particular areas that this paper focused on is
the particular nature of the regulation of business conduct and corporations in globally
interdependent activity spheres (marketisation), fundamentally changing national political
economies (privatisation), and a dramatic expansion of issue‐driven, functionalist regulatory
regimes (scientisation).127 This constellation, however, suggests nothing less than a
fundamental contestation and erosion of boundaries between state and non‐state actors,
official and unofficial law, public and private ordering.128 Above all, legal theory and doctrine
are faced with important methodological challenges. Politics matter still, but they are no longer
so easily defined as the politics of ‘The Right’ or ‘The Left’, which we learned to distinguish
domestically throughout the twentieth century and right up to the recent shock to the
financialised global economy. The questions that are raised not only by the commercial,
productive, but also the re‐distributive, sustainable, R&D related and routine/innovation‐
related activities of corporations do not lend themselves to straight‐forward categorisations of
either public or private, or of domestic or international. In response to this situation, it is
through the study of transnational regulatory regimes that a re‐visiting of the political questions
and issues that continue to arise around particular regulatory challenges or experiences
becomes possible. This study builds on an understanding of transnational law not as a separate
field, but as a method and approach to legal reasoning. We must re‐think law and regulation
without resorting to traditional distinctions in the belief that they will deliver the same
explanatory potential that we have grown accustomed to: instead, we must approach emerging
institutional regimes from a transnational regulatory perspective. And it is here that
comparative corporate law transforms itself into the study of these increasingly de‐
territorialised corporate governance regimes as an illustration of transnational legal pluralism.
Comparative corporate lawyers must search today for the equivalents of and for compatible
institutional settings and actors that allow a new turn of the long‐standing debates about the
corporation.
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